mirror of
https://github.com/tw93/Mole.git
synced 2026-02-04 19:44:44 +00:00
CRITICAL SECURITY FIX Enhanced the receipt file parsing in uninstall operations to prevent accidental deletion of critical system files while maintaining deep cleanup capabilities. Changes: - Tightened whitelist in find_app_receipt_files() to exclude /Users/*, /usr/*, and /opt/* broad patterns - Added explicit blacklist for /private/* with safe exceptions for logs, temp files, and diagnostic data - Integrated should_protect_path() check for additional protection - Added file deduplication with sort -u to prevent duplicate deletions - Removed dry-run feature from batch uninstall (unused entry point) Path Protection: ✅ Blocked: /etc/passwd, /var/db/*, /private/etc/*, all system binaries ✅ Allowed: /Applications/*, specific /Library/* subdirs, safe /private/* paths ✅ Additional: Keychain files, system preferences via should_protect_path() This fixes a critical security issue where parsing .bom receipt files could result in deletion of system files like /etc/passwd and /var/db/*, leading to system corruption and data loss. Affects: V1.12.14 and later versions Testing: Validated against critical system paths, all blocked correctly
388 lines
12 KiB
Bash
388 lines
12 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
|
|
# Mole - File Operations
|
|
# Safe file and directory manipulation with validation
|
|
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
# Prevent multiple sourcing
|
|
if [[ -n "${MOLE_FILE_OPS_LOADED:-}" ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
readonly MOLE_FILE_OPS_LOADED=1
|
|
|
|
# Ensure dependencies are loaded
|
|
_MOLE_CORE_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
|
if [[ -z "${MOLE_BASE_LOADED:-}" ]]; then
|
|
# shellcheck source=lib/core/base.sh
|
|
source "$_MOLE_CORE_DIR/base.sh"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "${MOLE_LOG_LOADED:-}" ]]; then
|
|
# shellcheck source=lib/core/log.sh
|
|
source "$_MOLE_CORE_DIR/log.sh"
|
|
fi
|
|
if [[ -z "${MOLE_TIMEOUT_LOADED:-}" ]]; then
|
|
# shellcheck source=lib/core/timeout.sh
|
|
source "$_MOLE_CORE_DIR/timeout.sh"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
# Path Validation
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
|
|
# Validate path for deletion (absolute, no traversal, not system dir)
|
|
validate_path_for_deletion() {
|
|
local path="$1"
|
|
|
|
# Check path is not empty
|
|
if [[ -z "$path" ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: empty path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check path is absolute
|
|
if [[ "$path" != /* ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: path must be absolute: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check for path traversal attempts
|
|
# Only reject .. when it appears as a complete path component (/../ or /.. or ../)
|
|
# This allows legitimate directory names containing .. (e.g., Firefox's "name..files")
|
|
if [[ "$path" =~ (^|/)\.\.(\/|$) ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: path traversal not allowed: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check path doesn't contain dangerous characters
|
|
if [[ "$path" =~ [[:cntrl:]] ]] || [[ "$path" =~ $'\n' ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: contains control characters: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Allow deletion of coresymbolicationd cache (safe system cache that can be rebuilt)
|
|
case "$path" in
|
|
/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.coresymbolicationd/data | /System/Library/Caches/com.apple.coresymbolicationd/data/*)
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Allow known safe paths under /private
|
|
case "$path" in
|
|
/private/tmp | /private/tmp/* | \
|
|
/private/var/tmp | /private/var/tmp/* | \
|
|
/private/var/log | /private/var/log/* | \
|
|
/private/var/folders | /private/var/folders/* | \
|
|
/private/var/db/diagnostics | /private/var/db/diagnostics/* | \
|
|
/private/var/db/DiagnosticPipeline | /private/var/db/DiagnosticPipeline/* | \
|
|
/private/var/db/powerlog | /private/var/db/powerlog/* | \
|
|
/private/var/db/reportmemoryexception | /private/var/db/reportmemoryexception/*)
|
|
return 0
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Check path isn't critical system directory
|
|
case "$path" in
|
|
/ | /bin | /bin/* | /sbin | /sbin/* | /usr | /usr/bin | /usr/bin/* | /usr/sbin | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/lib | /usr/lib/* | /System | /System/* | /Library/Extensions)
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: critical system directory: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
/private)
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: critical system directory: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
/etc | /etc/* | /private/etc | /private/etc/*)
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: /etc contains critical system files: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
/var | /var/db | /var/db/* | /private/var | /private/var/db | /private/var/db/*)
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed: /var/db contains system databases: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
;;
|
|
esac
|
|
|
|
# Check if path is protected (keychains, system settings, etc)
|
|
if declare -f should_protect_path > /dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
if should_protect_path "$path"; then
|
|
if [[ "${MO_DEBUG:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
log_warning "Path validation: protected path skipped: $path"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
# Safe Removal Operations
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
|
|
# Safe wrapper around rm -rf with validation
|
|
safe_remove() {
|
|
local path="$1"
|
|
local silent="${2:-false}"
|
|
|
|
# Validate path
|
|
if ! validate_path_for_deletion "$path"; then
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check if path exists
|
|
if [[ ! -e "$path" ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Dry-run mode: log but don't delete
|
|
if [[ "${MOLE_DRY_RUN:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${MO_DEBUG:-}" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
local file_type="file"
|
|
[[ -d "$path" ]] && file_type="directory"
|
|
[[ -L "$path" ]] && file_type="symlink"
|
|
|
|
local file_size=""
|
|
local file_age=""
|
|
|
|
if [[ -e "$path" ]]; then
|
|
local size_kb
|
|
size_kb=$(get_path_size_kb "$path" 2> /dev/null || echo "0")
|
|
if [[ "$size_kb" -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
file_size=$(bytes_to_human "$((size_kb * 1024))")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -f "$path" || -d "$path" ]] && ! [[ -L "$path" ]]; then
|
|
local mod_time
|
|
mod_time=$(stat -f%m "$path" 2> /dev/null || echo "0")
|
|
local now
|
|
now=$(date +%s 2> /dev/null || echo "0")
|
|
if [[ "$mod_time" -gt 0 && "$now" -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
file_age=$(((now - mod_time) / 86400))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debug_file_action "[DRY RUN] Would remove" "$path" "$file_size" "$file_age"
|
|
else
|
|
debug_log "[DRY RUN] Would remove: $path"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debug_log "Removing: $path"
|
|
|
|
# Perform the deletion
|
|
# Use || to capture the exit code so set -e won't abort on rm failures
|
|
local error_msg
|
|
local rm_exit=0
|
|
error_msg=$(rm -rf "$path" 2>&1) || rm_exit=$? # safe_remove
|
|
|
|
if [[ $rm_exit -eq 0 ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
# Check if it's a permission error
|
|
if [[ "$error_msg" == *"Permission denied"* ]] || [[ "$error_msg" == *"Operation not permitted"* ]]; then
|
|
MOLE_PERMISSION_DENIED_COUNT=${MOLE_PERMISSION_DENIED_COUNT:-0}
|
|
MOLE_PERMISSION_DENIED_COUNT=$((MOLE_PERMISSION_DENIED_COUNT + 1))
|
|
export MOLE_PERMISSION_DENIED_COUNT
|
|
debug_log "Permission denied: $path (may need Full Disk Access)"
|
|
else
|
|
[[ "$silent" != "true" ]] && log_error "Failed to remove: $path"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Safe sudo removal with symlink protection
|
|
safe_sudo_remove() {
|
|
local path="$1"
|
|
|
|
# Validate path
|
|
if ! validate_path_for_deletion "$path"; then
|
|
log_error "Path validation failed for sudo remove: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Check if path exists
|
|
if [[ ! -e "$path" ]]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Additional check: reject symlinks for sudo operations
|
|
if [[ -L "$path" ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Refusing to sudo remove symlink: $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Dry-run mode: log but don't delete
|
|
if [[ "${MOLE_DRY_RUN:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
if [[ "${MO_DEBUG:-}" == "1" ]]; then
|
|
local file_type="file"
|
|
[[ -d "$path" ]] && file_type="directory"
|
|
|
|
local file_size=""
|
|
local file_age=""
|
|
|
|
if sudo test -e "$path" 2> /dev/null; then
|
|
local size_kb
|
|
size_kb=$(sudo du -sk "$path" 2> /dev/null | awk '{print $1}' || echo "0")
|
|
if [[ "$size_kb" -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
file_size=$(bytes_to_human "$((size_kb * 1024))")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if sudo test -f "$path" 2> /dev/null || sudo test -d "$path" 2> /dev/null; then
|
|
local mod_time
|
|
mod_time=$(sudo stat -f%m "$path" 2> /dev/null || echo "0")
|
|
local now
|
|
now=$(date +%s 2> /dev/null || echo "0")
|
|
if [[ "$mod_time" -gt 0 && "$now" -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
file_age=$(((now - mod_time) / 86400))
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debug_file_action "[DRY RUN] Would remove (sudo)" "$path" "$file_size" "$file_age"
|
|
else
|
|
debug_log "[DRY RUN] Would remove (sudo): $path"
|
|
fi
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debug_log "Removing (sudo): $path"
|
|
|
|
# Perform the deletion
|
|
if sudo rm -rf "$path" 2> /dev/null; then # SAFE: safe_sudo_remove implementation
|
|
return 0
|
|
else
|
|
log_error "Failed to remove (sudo): $path"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
# Safe Find and Delete Operations
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
|
|
# Safe file discovery and deletion with depth and age limits
|
|
safe_find_delete() {
|
|
local base_dir="$1"
|
|
local pattern="$2"
|
|
local age_days="${3:-7}"
|
|
local type_filter="${4:-f}"
|
|
|
|
# Validate base directory exists and is not a symlink
|
|
if [[ ! -d "$base_dir" ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Directory does not exist: $base_dir"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if [[ -L "$base_dir" ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Refusing to search symlinked directory: $base_dir"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Validate type filter
|
|
if [[ "$type_filter" != "f" && "$type_filter" != "d" ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Invalid type filter: $type_filter (must be 'f' or 'd')"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debug_log "Finding in $base_dir: $pattern (age: ${age_days}d, type: $type_filter)"
|
|
|
|
local find_args=("-maxdepth" "5" "-name" "$pattern" "-type" "$type_filter")
|
|
if [[ "$age_days" -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
find_args+=("-mtime" "+$age_days")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Iterate results to respect should_protect_path
|
|
while IFS= read -r -d '' match; do
|
|
if should_protect_path "$match"; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
safe_remove "$match" true || true
|
|
done < <(command find "$base_dir" "${find_args[@]}" -print0 2> /dev/null || true)
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Safe sudo discovery and deletion
|
|
safe_sudo_find_delete() {
|
|
local base_dir="$1"
|
|
local pattern="$2"
|
|
local age_days="${3:-7}"
|
|
local type_filter="${4:-f}"
|
|
|
|
# Validate base directory (use sudo for permission-restricted dirs)
|
|
if ! sudo test -d "$base_dir" 2> /dev/null; then
|
|
debug_log "Directory does not exist (skipping): $base_dir"
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
if sudo test -L "$base_dir" 2> /dev/null; then
|
|
log_error "Refusing to search symlinked directory: $base_dir"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Validate type filter
|
|
if [[ "$type_filter" != "f" && "$type_filter" != "d" ]]; then
|
|
log_error "Invalid type filter: $type_filter (must be 'f' or 'd')"
|
|
return 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
debug_log "Finding (sudo) in $base_dir: $pattern (age: ${age_days}d, type: $type_filter)"
|
|
|
|
local find_args=("-maxdepth" "5" "-name" "$pattern" "-type" "$type_filter")
|
|
if [[ "$age_days" -gt 0 ]]; then
|
|
find_args+=("-mtime" "+$age_days")
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Iterate results to respect should_protect_path
|
|
while IFS= read -r -d '' match; do
|
|
if should_protect_path "$match"; then
|
|
continue
|
|
fi
|
|
safe_sudo_remove "$match" || true
|
|
done < <(sudo find "$base_dir" "${find_args[@]}" -print0 2> /dev/null || true)
|
|
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
# Size Calculation
|
|
# ============================================================================
|
|
|
|
# Get path size in KB (returns 0 if not found)
|
|
get_path_size_kb() {
|
|
local path="$1"
|
|
[[ -z "$path" || ! -e "$path" ]] && {
|
|
echo "0"
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
# Direct execution without timeout overhead - critical for performance in loops
|
|
# Use || echo 0 to ensure failure in du (e.g. permission error) doesn't exit script under set -e
|
|
# Pipefail would normally cause the pipeline to fail if du fails, but || handle catches it.
|
|
local size
|
|
size=$(command du -sk "$path" 2> /dev/null | awk 'NR==1 {print $1; exit}' || true)
|
|
|
|
# Ensure size is a valid number (fix for non-numeric du output)
|
|
if [[ "$size" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
|
|
echo "$size"
|
|
else
|
|
echo "0"
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Calculate total size for multiple paths
|
|
calculate_total_size() {
|
|
local files="$1"
|
|
local total_kb=0
|
|
|
|
while IFS= read -r file; do
|
|
if [[ -n "$file" && -e "$file" ]]; then
|
|
local size_kb
|
|
size_kb=$(get_path_size_kb "$file")
|
|
((total_kb += size_kb))
|
|
fi
|
|
done <<< "$files"
|
|
|
|
echo "$total_kb"
|
|
}
|