# Mole Security Audit Report
**Status:** PASSED | **Risk Level:** LOW | **Version:** 1.19.0 (2026-01-09)
--- ## Audit Overview | Attribute | Details | |-----------|---------| | Audit Date | January 9, 2026 | | Audit Conclusion | **PASSED** | | Mole Version | V1.19.0 | | Audited Branch | `main` (HEAD) | | Scope | Shell scripts, Go binaries, Configuration | | Methodology | Static analysis, Threat modeling, Code review | | Review Cycle | Every 6 months or after major feature additions | | Next Review | June 2026 | **Key Findings:** - Multi-layer validation effectively blocks risky system modifications. - Conservative cleaning logic ensures safety (e.g., 60-day dormancy rule). - Comprehensive protection for VPNs, AI tools, and core system components. - Atomic operations prevent state corruption during crashes. - Dry-run and whitelist features give users full control. - Installer cleanup scans safely and requires user confirmation. --- ## Security Philosophy **Core Principle: "Do No Harm"** We built Mole on a **Zero Trust** architecture for filesystem operations. Every modification request is treated as dangerous until it passes strict validation. **Guiding Priorities:** 1. **System Stability First** - We'd rather leave 1GB of junk than delete 1KB of your data. 2. **Conservative by Default** - High-risk operations always require explicit confirmation. 3. **Fail Safe** - When in doubt, we abort immediately. 4. **Transparency** - Every operation is logged and allows a preview via dry-run mode. --- ## Threat Model ### Attack Vectors & Mitigations | Threat | Risk Level | Mitigation | Status | |--------|------------|------------|--------| | Accidental System File Deletion | Critical | Multi-layer path validation, system directory blocklist | Mitigated | | Path Traversal Attack | High | Absolute path enforcement, relative path rejection | Mitigated | | Symlink Exploitation | High | Symlink detection in privileged mode | Mitigated | | Command Injection | High | Control character filtering, strict validation | Mitigated | | Empty Variable Deletion | High | Empty path validation, defensive checks | Mitigated | | Race Conditions | Medium | Atomic operations, process isolation | Mitigated | | Network Mount Hangs | Medium | Timeout protection, volume type detection | Mitigated | | Privilege Escalation | Medium | Restricted sudo scope, user home validation | Mitigated | | False Positive Deletion | Medium | 3-char minimum, fuzzy matching disabled | Mitigated | | VPN Configuration Loss | Medium | Comprehensive VPN/proxy whitelist | Mitigated | --- ## Defense Architecture ### Multi-Layered Validation System All automated operations pass through hardened middleware (`lib/core/file_ops.sh`) with 4 layers of validation: #### Layer 1: Input Sanitization | Control | Protection Against | |---------|---------------------| | Absolute Path Enforcement | Path traversal attacks (`../etc`) | | Control Character Filtering | Command injection (`\n`, `\r`, `\0`) | | Empty Variable Protection | Accidental `rm -rf /` | | Secure Temp Workspaces | Data leakage, race conditions | **Code:** `lib/core/file_ops.sh:validate_path_for_deletion()` #### Layer 2: System Path Protection ("Iron Dome") Even with `sudo`, these paths are **unconditionally blocked**: ```bash / # Root filesystem /System # macOS system files /bin, /sbin, /usr # Core binaries /etc, /var # System configuration /Library/Extensions # Kernel extensions ``` **Exception:** `/System/Library/Caches/com.apple.coresymbolicationd/data` (safe, rebuildable cache). **Code:** `lib/core/file_ops.sh:60-78` #### Layer 3: Symlink Detection For privileged operations, pre-flight checks prevent symlink-based attacks: - Detects symlinks from cache folders pointing to system files. - Refuses recursive deletion of symbolic links in sudo mode. - Validates real path vs. symlink target. **Code:** `lib/core/file_ops.sh:safe_sudo_recursive_delete()` #### Layer 4: Permission Management When running with `sudo`: - Auto-corrects ownership back to user (`chown -R`). - Restricts operations to the user's home directory. - Enforces multiple validation checkpoints. ### Interactive Analyzer (Go) The analyzer (`mo analyze`) uses a distinct security model: - Runs with standard user permissions only. - Respects macOS System Integrity Protection (SIP). - **Two-Key Confirmation:** Deletion requires ⌫ (Delete) to enter confirmation mode, then Enter to confirm. Prevents accidental double-press of the same key. - **Trash Instead of Delete:** Files are moved to macOS Trash using Finder's native API, allowing easy recovery if needed. - OS-level enforcement (cannot delete `/System` due to Read-Only Volume). **Code:** `cmd/analyze/*.go` --- ## Safety Mechanisms ### Conservative Cleaning Logic #### The "60-Day Rule" for Orphaned Data | Step | Verification | Criterion | |------|--------------|-----------| | 1. App Check | All installation locations | Must be missing from `/Applications`, `~/Applications`, `/System/Applications` | | 2. Dormancy | Modification timestamps | Untouched for ≥60 days | | 3. Vendor Whitelist | Cross-reference database | Adobe, Microsoft, and Google resources are protected | **Code:** `lib/clean/apps.sh:orphan_detection()` #### Active Uninstallation Heuristics For user-selected app removal: - **Sanitized Name Matching:** "Visual Studio Code" → `VisualStudioCode`, `.vscode` - **Safety Limit:** 3-char minimum (prevents "Go" matching "Google") - **Disabled:** Fuzzy matching and wildcard expansion for short names. - **User Confirmation:** Required before deletion. **Code:** `lib/clean/apps.sh:uninstall_app()` #### System Protection Policies | Protected Category | Scope | Reason | |--------------------|-------|--------| | System Integrity Protection | `/Library/Updates`, `/System/*` | Respects macOS Read-Only Volume | | Spotlight & System UI | `~/Library/Metadata/CoreSpotlight` | Prevents UI corruption | | System Components | Control Center, System Settings, TCC | Centralized detection via `is_critical_system_component()` | | Time Machine | Local snapshots, backups | Checks `backupd` process, aborts if active | | VPN & Proxy | Shadowsocks, V2Ray, Tailscale, Clash | Protects network configs | | AI & LLM Tools | Cursor, Claude, ChatGPT, Ollama, LM Studio | Protects models, tokens, and sessions | | Startup Items | `com.apple.*` LaunchAgents/Daemons | System items unconditionally skipped | **Orphaned Helper Cleanup (`opt_startup_items_cleanup`):** Removes LaunchAgents/Daemons whose associated app has been uninstalled: - Checks `AssociatedBundleIdentifiers` to detect orphans. - Skips all `com.apple.*` system items. - Skips paths under `/System/*`, `/usr/bin/*`, `/usr/lib/*`, `/usr/sbin/*`, `/Library/Apple/*`. - Uses `safe_remove` / `safe_sudo_remove` with path validation. - Unloads service via `launchctl` before deletion. - **Timeout Protection:** 10-second limit on `mdfind` operations. **Code:** `lib/optimize/tasks.sh:opt_startup_items_cleanup()` ### Crash Safety & Atomic Operations | Operation | Safety Mechanism | Recovery Behavior | |-----------|------------------|-------------------| | Network Interface Reset | Atomic execution blocks | Wi-Fi/AirDrop restored to pre-operation state | | Swap Clearing | Daemon restart | `dynamic_pager` handles recovery safely | | Volume Scanning | Timeout + filesystem check | Auto-skip unresponsive NFS/SMB/AFP mounts | | Homebrew Cache | Pre-flight size check | Skip if <50MB (avoids long delays) | | Network Volume Check | `diskutil info` with timeout | Prevents hangs on slow/dead mounts | | SQLite Vacuum | App-running check + 20s timeout | Skips if Mail/Safari/Messages active | | dyld Cache Update | 24-hour freshness check + 180s timeout | Skips if recently updated | | App Bundle Search | 10s timeout on mdfind | Fallback to standard paths | **Timeout Example:** ```bash run_with_timeout 5 diskutil info "$mount_point" || skip_volume ``` **Code:** `lib/core/base.sh:run_with_timeout()`, `lib/optimize/*.sh` --- ## User Controls ### Dry-Run Mode **Command:** `mo clean --dry-run` | `mo optimize --dry-run` **Behavior:** - Simulates the entire operation without modifying a single file. - Lists every file/directory that **would** be deleted. - Calculates total space that **would** be freed. - **Zero risk** - no actual deletion commands are executed. ### Custom Whitelists **File:** `~/.config/mole/whitelist` **Format:** ```bash # One path per line - exact matches only /Users/username/important-cache ~/Library/Application Support/CriticalApp ``` - Paths are **unconditionally protected**. - Applies to all operations (clean, optimize, uninstall). - Supports absolute paths and `~` expansion. **Code:** `lib/core/file_ops.sh:is_whitelisted()` ### Interactive Confirmations We mandate confirmation for: - Uninstalling system-scope applications. - Removing large data directories (>1GB). - Deleting items from shared vendor folders. --- ## Testing & Compliance ### Test Coverage Mole uses **BATS (Bash Automated Testing System)** for automated testing. | Test Category | Coverage | Key Tests | |---------------|----------|-----------| | Core File Operations | 95% | Path validation, symlink detection, permissions | | Cleaning Logic | 87% | Orphan detection, 60-day rule, vendor whitelist | | Optimization | 82% | Cache cleanup, timeouts | | System Maintenance | 90% | Time Machine, network volumes, crash recovery | | Security Controls | 100% | Path traversal, command injection, symlinks | **Total:** 180+ tests | **Overall Coverage:** ~88% **Test Execution:** ```bash bats tests/ # Run all tests bats tests/security.bats # Run specific suite ``` ### Standards Compliance | Standard | Implementation | |----------|----------------| | OWASP Secure Coding | Input validation, least privilege, defense-in-depth | | CWE-22 (Path Traversal) | Enhanced detection: rejects `/../` components, safely handles `..` in directory names | | CWE-78 (Command Injection) | Control character filtering | | CWE-59 (Link Following) | Symlink detection before privileged operations | | Apple File System Guidelines | Respects SIP, Read-Only Volumes, TCC | ### Security Development Lifecycle - **Static Analysis:** `shellcheck` runs on all shell scripts. - **Code Review:** All changes are manually reviewed by maintainers. - **Dependency Scanning:** Minimal external dependencies, all carefully vetted. ### Known Limitations | Limitation | Impact | Mitigation | |------------|--------|------------| | Requires `sudo` for system caches | Initial friction | Clear documentation explaining why | | 60-day rule may delay cleanup | Some orphans remain longer | Manual `mo uninstall` is always available | | No undo functionality | Deleted files are unrecoverable | Dry-run mode and warnings are clear | | English-only name matching | May miss non-English apps | Fallback to Bundle ID matching | **Intentionally Out of Scope (Safety):** - Automatic deletion of user documents/media. - Encryption key stores or password managers. - System configuration files (`/etc/*`). - Browser history or cookies. - Git repository cleanup. --- ## Dependencies ### System Binaries Mole relies on standard, SIP-protected macOS system binaries: | Binary | Purpose | Fallback | |--------|---------|----------| | `plutil` | Validate `.plist` integrity | Skip invalid plists | | `tmutil` | Time Machine interaction | Skip TM cleanup | | `dscacheutil` | System cache rebuilding | Optional optimization | | `diskutil` | Volume information | Skip network volumes | ### Go Dependencies (Interactive Tools) The compiled Go binary (`analyze-go`) includes: | Library | Version | Purpose | License | |---------|---------|---------|---------| | `bubbletea` | v0.23+ | TUI framework | MIT | | `lipgloss` | v0.6+ | Terminal styling | MIT | | `gopsutil` | v3.22+ | System metrics | BSD-3 | | `xxhash` | v2.2+ | Fast hashing | BSD-2 | **Supply Chain Security:** - All dependencies are pinned to specific versions. - Regular security audits. - No transitive dependencies with known CVEs. - **Automated Releases**: Binaries are compiled and signed via GitHub Actions. - **Source Only**: The repository contains no pre-compiled binaries. --- **Our Commitment:** This document certifies that Mole implements industry-standard defensive programming practices and strictly adheres to macOS security guidelines. We prioritize system stability and data integrity above all else. *For security concerns or vulnerability reports, please open an issue or contact the maintainers directly.*